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The decline, or stagnation, in broad-based social expenditure, so crucial to the well being of mother and
child, occurs because of various reasons. First, the government may derive less utility from this category
of expenditure, compared to spending on its political support group, the military or other prestige
projects. Second, the authorities may find that they have less revenue in the era of globalization because
of international tax competition, falling domestic tax bases and capital flight. Third, in the interests of
macroeconomic stability the government may have to balance its books. This usually means expenditure
reduction rather than revenue expansion. In a setting of overall spending cuts, the burden borne by the
social sector is often greater than in other areas such as defence. This paper is concerned with aspects of
both the revenue and expenditure side in the provision of social services. It demonstrates that small and
vulnerable developing can be seriously disadvantaged by international tax competition in mobile factors.
This is most applicable to North-South tax competition, as well as competition between larger and smaller
nations in the South. The very existence of mobile capital, and the danger of its exit, may induce
developing countries in general to lower corporate tax rates below the OECD average. On the expenditure
side, policy coherence amongst bilateral and multilateral donors is necessary in the context of the HIPC
initiative, which aims to divert debt-servicing to social sector expenditure. It is important that donors
move towards greater complementarity in designing aid-conditionality.
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1 Introduction
Globalization, or the increased openness, since 1980 has led to the marginalization of
many developing countries, as far as the fruits and benefits of globalization are
concerned (Murshed 2000). Yet, opting out of the present-day globalized economic
system is not a seriously viable alternative for any country. It is important to emphasize
the newer vulnerabilities engendered by the rapid pace of globalization during the past
two decades. Among them is the fact that a more open economy will be subject to
greater fluctuations in economic activity. A fifth of humanity (about 1.2 billion
individuals) live in abject poverty with incomes below a dollar a day. The actual
number of people living in poverty is greater than this, once we take into account those
individuals whose lot is euphemistically described as being that of the ‘near’ poor. This,
broader, poverty figure for the world is actually rising. The ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s
for Latin America and Africa still persists in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Over 40
countries in 1998 were still saddled with real per-capita incomes they had achieved two
or three decades earlier. Accompanying this growth failure are the inevitable entitlement
losses such as those associated with malnutrition, infant mortality and increased
susceptibility to infectious disease.
Globalization presents a challenge for social policy. Openness raises vulnerability, a
problem that is even more acute for nations that have failed to grow. It is increasingly
accepted that globalization raises income inequality (Milanovic 2002). This is true, even
for countries that are on average prospering from globalization, leave alone the growth
failures of the world. Indeed, globalization may add to the sources of income risk for the
poor in the sense described by Holzmann and Jorgensen (2000). This raises the need for
social protection. Social spending on health and education is part of this insurance
against the risks raised by globalization. Social expenditure is also consistent with a
development trajectory that leads to sustainable human development. But there is
another, efficiency, argument for social expenditure in the health and education sectors.
This states that public expenditure in these fields augments human capital, raising
productivity and growth rates.
Given all of these reasons we are left with the question as to why broad-based spending
on the social sector by governments in developing countries is declining in many cases.
This is a result of the paucity of both will and means. Governments in developing
countries face declining revenues. Many are highly indebted and have to divert a
considerable portion of government revenues to debt servicing. In addition the advent of
globalization has meant trade liberalization, sometimes under the guise of structural
adjustment programmes. Traditionally, trade taxes or import duties, now lowered, had
been an important source of government revenue in low-income countries. Moreover,
low-income countries have a very small income-tax base by virtue of being poor.
Another source of revenue is the tax levied on the profits of multinational companies.
But here it should be remembered that foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing
countries is highly skewed, with about ten countries accounting for two-thirds or more
of FDI inflows from the OECD. Most low-income developing countries attract very
little FDI, and therefore cannot obtain much tax revenue from this source. If that is the
case, then the tax competition (or lowering of taxes) to attract mobile international
capital should be more applicable in the aggregate North-South arena, or developed-
developing country interaction. Corporate tax rates are on an average lower in the South2
relative to the North. On the whole, tax competition on mobile international capital, has
reduced corporate tax rates levied on multinationals globally. They are often granted
major financial concessions.1 Finally, globalization is said to have increased the size
and scope of avoidance and evasion on the tax obligations of the rich in developing
countries. Opportunities for capital flight have increased, and offshore financial centres
have mushroomed, including ‘offshore’ and shadowy activities in major G-7 nations.2
But the shortfall in revenues, or means, is only one side of the coin. Governments must
have the will or desire to engage in broad-based social spending. But they are not
always benevolent. Even when the means exist they do not always expend resources on
broad-based social spending. Many observers regard government, particularly central
government, as the ‘Leviathan’, with an insatiable appetite for vainglorious expenditure
(Eichenberger and Frey 1996). In a developing country context this means expenditure
on the military, prestige projects, as well as spending on a discriminatory/sectarian basis
or on supporters. More importantly when total government expenditure has to be cut, it
is these prestige projects and military expenditure that are most resilient. This means
that social expenditure declines more than proportionately when there is an overall
decline in spending.
In summary, it means that faced with falling revenues, structural adjustment
programmes requiring movement to a balanced budget, lower import taxes, tax
competition in mobile factors, supply shocks and the political imperative to spend on
the military, elites and supporters there is a fall in broad-based social sector expenditure.
To that we have to add the realization that the state anywhere is less than benevolent.
This paper will address some of the issues outlined in the previous paragraph. I will be
concerned with aspects of both the revenue and expenditure side in the provision of
social services. Section 2 deals with the revenue dimension, mainly tax competition. It
demonstrates analytically that small and vulnerable developing can be seriously
disadvantaged by international tax competition in mobile factors. There may be a race to
or towards the bottom, as far as tax rates are concerned, especially for weaker countries
in the South. This analysis is applicable to North-South tax competition, as well as
competition between larger and smaller nations in the South. Section 3 deals with the
expenditure side, including government preferences about different types of spending,
and is also concerned with the current HIPC initiative to divert debt servicing towards
social spending. Section 4 deals with some stylized facts on social expenditure and
government revenues. Finally, section 5 concludes with some policy recommendations.
2 Revenue side
This section will be concerned about mechanisms via which tax revenues to
governments in developing countries might potentially decline due to globalization.
Globalization implies integration, internationalization and international mobility. There
are two sources of difficulty that increased globalization might bring to the revenue
1 There is a global trend for taxes to be levied more on immobile relative to mobile factor incomes.
2 For example, the involvement of British banks in money laundering by the Abacha regime in Nigeria,
and the role of a US bank in Russian financial irregularities.3
raising capacity of these nations. The first is a diminished ability to tax international
capital inflows, and the second is to do with a reduced capacity to tax rich citizens
whose savings are increasingly mobile in an outward direction from the domestic tax
jurisdiction. The bulk of the analysis in this section will be concerned with the first
issue. One estimate of the revenue loss from ‘tax competition’ in taxing profits on FDI
by multinationals is about US$35 billion (OXFAM 2000). This refers to the lower tax
rates on company profits, which averages at 20 percent for developing countries
compared to the 35 percent OECD average. The calculation is based on a FDI capital
stock of US$1220 billion attracting a 20 percent profit, taxed at 35 percent not 20
percent. Additionally, there will be a further loss of revenues due to the tax avoiding
behaviour of multinationals, transfer pricing. OXFAM (2000) estimates the loss of
revenue from the inability to tax rich domestic residents in developing countries at
US$15 billion. This is based on an estimate of capital flight, equivalent to US$700
billion being taxed at 22 percent. The grand total from these two effects amounts to
US$50 billion. This is approximately equivalent to the total amount of official
development assistance (ODA) to developing countries.
To deal with international tax competition first, mobile international capital inflows are
said to lead to the phenomenon of tax competition. This, it is said, has led to a reduction
in corporate tax rates. Moreover there is meant to be a ‘race to the bottom’; as countries
compete on tax rates they drive these tax rates down towards zero. I will demonstrate
that this type of competition might disadvantage smaller and poorer less developed
countries. Larger and/or richer nations, particularly in the North, might be able to
attract, or continue attracting, mobile capital even when they charge higher taxes than
their relatively less profitable, poorer and smaller counterparts. This might occur even
with perfectly mobile international capital. Furthermore, I will show that there is not
always a tendency towards a race to the bottom, rather than the zero tax rates, associated
with rock bottom.
For analytical simplicity let there only be two countries (indexed i =1 ,2 ) . 3 Let Y denote
output derived from mobile international capital or foreign direct investment (FDI).
Note that Y, does not denote total GDP. In country, i:
K denotes the capital-labour ratio into country i. Note that total corporate tax revenues
are related to capital stocks, while tax competition concerns capital inflows. The
remainder of this section deals with capital inflows. Let the total amount of capital
flows into the two countries, during the period in question, be fixed:
The after-tax profit rate on capital (r) in country i,i sg i v e nb y :
Where Fi is the marginal product of K in country i,a n dt stands for a proportional tax on
3 In what follows, superscripts refer to countries (1 and 2), subscripts to partial derivatives.
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Y. For analytical simplicity the tax is levied on Y, and not the fraction of Y that
represents profits.
The revenue to the government in country i, from this source (R
F) is given by:
The above holds true when there is no international capital mobility between the two
countries in response to tax rate differentials. If, however, in every period capital could
choose where to locate in response to ex-ante tax rate differentials, then its location
decisions would lead to the equalization of post-tax earning rates on capital in both
countries.4 Utilizing equation (3) we would have:
This is the result of the no arbitrage condition whereby post-tax rates are equalized in
the two countries. Note that if the marginal product of capital is greater in one country it
can set a higher tax rate than in the other country. In our example it is country 1. This
could occur if country 1 has a larger and more productive capital stock. Other reasons
could include a larger market in country 1, or a better risk perception.
We could define a government revenue function in general form as:
In this function, each country’s revenues depend on the capital stock locating in that
country. But unlike in (4) the capital stock, in turn, is also a function of the tax rates in
both countries due to international tax competition.
What would occur if country 1 raised its taxes? Differentiating (6) with respect to t for
country 1 yields:
Note that there are two terms on the right hand side of (7). The first term is the direct tax
or revenue effect. The second term is the indirect or tax-base effect of a marginal
change in taxes. Note that it is negative, as K1< 0 because as the tax rate is raised in the
home country less capital locates there. [But if the other country raises its taxes, more
capital flows into the home country, K2 > 0.] This effect is only present in an open
economy, and in the presence of tax competition. Otherwise the second term on the
right hand side of (7) would vanish. The important point is that the presence or
emergence of tax competition lowers each country’s ability to obtain tax revenues.
Each government will maximize revenue by setting (7) equal to zero. In effect, the two
countries are playing a non-cooperative game, or a Cournot-Nash game. This game is
4 Governments move first by announcing tax rates. This is followed by investment location decisions.
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what we refer to as tax competition. The reaction functions for both countries can be
obtained from (7).5 For country 1:
A similar expression can be obtained for country 2. The two reaction functions in
Figure 1 are upward sloping, as an increase in one country’s tax rate results in the other
country following suit. Their intersection defines the equilibrium of the tax competition
game. Notice that two reaction functions are in place for country 2. The upper reaction
function refers to country 2 when it is equal to country 1; the bottom reaction function
applies when it is weaker.
Figure 1
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(i) In the present example, country 1 has an advantage over country 2. This is to
illustrate that tax competition could disadvantage small nations, compared to large
neighbouring countries. This result is unlike in much of the literature, for example
in Kanbur and Keen (1993).6 In fact, country 1 may be viewed as a country in the
North, and country 2 as a small nation in the South. At point B in Figure 1,
country 1 is able to set a higher tax rate and capture more revenues than country 2.
This is because capital is more productive in country 1 (F1>F2), and marginal tax
increases discourage capital inflows to a lesser degree in country 1(K12>K21).
Beggar my neighbour tax policies could actually favour larger countries,
especially in the North over the South. This is a point that is not normally dealt
with in the literature. Note that country 1’s reaction function is steeper than
country 2’s showing that it adjusts its tax rate by a smaller amount in response to
its rival. If the two countries were symmetric then the equilibrium will be at
point D. Both countries could, however, obtain more revenues in the absence of
tax competition and mobile capital.
(ii) Generally, there is a race towards the bottom, rather than a race to the bottom as a
result of tax competition (see also Dehejia and Genschel 1997). This is because
FDI involves fixed or sunk costs unlike equities or savings. Even if tax rates are
greater in one country not all the FDI stock can instantly relocate. Of course, the
FDI stock can exit in the longer run.
(iii) There is a possibility, however, of a race to the bottom for country 2. If the
productivity of FDI capital is very low in country 2, then the equilibrium could be
at point C in Figure 1, a corner solution. It might set its tax rates equal to zero and
still attract little FDI. The reaction function of country 2 would be subject to a
sharp discontinuity at point B, corresponding to the vertical axis in Figure 1
between the origin and point C. This captures the reality of FDI for most low-
income developing countries; some ten (mainly large) countries account for at
least two-thirds of all developing country FDI inflows. The outcome at point C
may also be viewed as the fate of a small vulnerable low-income country in the
South, following North-South tax competition.
(iv) A cooperative outcome might generate better results for both governments. But
cooperation in terms of tax rates is fraught with difficulties, dangers of defection,
as well as a variety of other coordination failures. The distribution of gains from
coordination (who gets what) is unclear, and there could be many free rider
problems. Such a coalition can only be stable if most countries, including the G-7
nations, are credibly committed to it.
(v) If one country were to be a Stackelberg leader, it is not necessarily better off
compared to the follower. For country 1 Stackelberg equilibrium might be to the
left of B, C or D in Figure 1.
The analysis above is applicable to corporate taxation of foreign direct investment.
Moving on to the second point raised at the beginning of this section, it has been
6 They show, in the context of commodity taxation, that small countries can always attract more sales.7
strongly argued that globalization reduces the capacity to tax the income or savings of
wealthy individuals (OXFAM 2000, for example). This is because globalization might
improve the technology of tax avoidance and evasion via increased international
offshore overseas opportunities to invest savings. If that is the case, the revenues of
government from this source (R
S) will be attenuated.
) 9 (
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N is a measure of national income, a < 1, and represents increased opportunities
for ‘capital flight’. This serves to lower total revenues in the context of an already low
tax base caused by low per-capita incomes.
3 Expenditure side
So far we have been concerned with the revenue side. But on the expenditure side too,
there might be difficulties in directing spending towards the social sector. This could
occur for two reasons: (i) the government itself is relatively unconcerned with social
expenditure compared to other forms of government consumption; or (ii) policies of
structural adjustment and budgetary balance have led to overall government expenditure
reduction. In reality, both these factors coincide and are inter-connected.
Consider a general form of the government budget constraint:
) 10 ( H A R iD G + + = -
Here G represents expenditures and the right-hand side we have income sources
composed of tax revenues (R) from all sources including excise and import duties; aid
(A); and the inflation tax or seignorage revenue (H). Current government borrowing is
omitted, as in low-income countries it takes the form of soft loans from aid donors. Debt
servicing is indicated by iD,w h e r eD denoting the stock of debt and i is the interest rate
applicable to debt. Debt servicing results in the dimunition of available revenues for
government expenditure.
Turning to the composition of government expenditures, we could decompose these into
two generic types of spending for our purposes:
) 11 ( S M iD G + = -
where M indicates military expenditure, spending on prestige projects and social sector
expenditure that is either elitist or sectarian7 and S stands for broad-based social
expenditure.
The government will not have a neutral attitude towards the various types of state
spending. Its preferences regarding expenditure will be related to some utility function.
In a democracy with voting, this will coincide with median voter preferences.
Government spending may be swayed by its political supporters and contributors to its
7 This involves favouring certain groups over others. So by social spending (S), I mean broad-based
spending on the entire population.8
coffers to the cost of others. Alternatively, it could combine the interests of supporters
with a degree of altruism, or even fear, of the rest of the population. On the endogenous
formation of government policy functions in respect of trade and domestic taxes, see
Helpman (1997) and Murshed (2001). Let us say that the government’s utility function
(U) takes the following specific form:
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The expression, f represents a fixed expenditure on M without which the government
cannot cling on to power. It also captures an indivisibility in the total expenditure on M.
It can easily be shown that the expenditure share of M increases as the total income
available to the government declines.8 Additionally, an authoritarian, or even a
benevolent government, may derive greater utility from military expenditure and other
unproductive spending, M compared to S. The political imperative of looking after one’s
own often dictates this. M is spent on the political support group, who may be much
fewer in number than the general mass of people, but are better at organizing
themselves (Olsen 1965).
Structural adjustment policies have meant that many developing countries have had to
balance the budget. In terms of (10) above this implies bringing income into line with
expenditure. This can be done either by raising more revenue via taxes or reducing
government expenditure. Seignorage taxes are ruled out by anti-inflationary policies,
and the real level of aid is stagnant if not declining. Moreover, the reduction of trade
taxes may actually lower total revenues. The tax base may also decline due to poor
growth rates and supply shocks. Many governments in low-income countries have
responded to the fiscal conditionality associated with structural adjustment by lowering
expenditure, as low incomes rule out an expansion of the tax base. Overall revenues
could decline (dR < 0) due to falling import tax revenues and supply shocks. So given a
government utility function of the type in (12), falling revenues mean a fall in the share
of social sector expenditure.
We then come to the highly indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative, as well as the
emphasis now being put on poverty reduction. Under the HIPC schemes, donors would
like to see increased spending in the social sector in return for debt forgiveness, as this
is pro-poor. This will occur if the utility function is of the type in (12) above. If,
however, at higher incomes the utility function alters such that f = 0 in (12) then an
increase in government revenues due to debt forgiveness will not cause a more than
proportionate increase in S expenditure. In those circumstances, we are likely to be
confronted with the familiar fungibility problem associated with resource transfers,
whereby part of the transfer can be diverted to purposes other than what it is intended
for. Success in overcoming the fungibility problem requires a greater degree of policy
coherence amongst various donors in designing conditionality. This is notoriously
difficult to achieve with many donors or principals dealing with the same recipient who
has multiple set of conditionality to meet, many of which contradict each other. See,
Murshed (2001), as well as Murshed and Sen (1995) on some of these issues at a
conceptual level. Designing conditionality, which takes the form of high powered
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incentives, becomes more difficult the more conflicting are the various tasks associated
with the many conditionalities. For example, one donor say an international financial
institution (the IMF) may want budgetary balance. Another donor, say a Nordic country,
might wish greater social sector expenditure. The recipient cannot exert effort to meet
one set of conditions without lowering effort in another direction of conditionality. This
would not be a problem if the different types of conditionality were complementary, in
terms of the implied tasks and efforts. It is, therefore, imperative that donors move
towards greater policy coherence, which means increased complementarity in aid-
conditionality design.
Some might think it necessary to influence the process of government expenditure
policy formation in developing countries. This refers to the government utility function
in (12), and this process is even more difficult than designing aid or debt relief
conditionality. It involves the domestic political process, and even if that were possible
it would raise thorny issues concerning ownership of policy and interference in state
sovereignty.
4 Stylized facts on revenues and expenditures
In this section I will focus my attention mainly on the highly indebted low-income
countries in Africa for whom data on revenues and expenditure are available.9 This is
because these countries are central to the HIPC initiatives, as well as the stated donor
aims regarding poverty eradication.
Chart 1 displays information on total tax revenues as a proportion of GDP for several
highly indebted countries in Africa. There are sharp fluctuations in revenue, but the
average (median) is displaying a steady decline since 1980. Table 1 reflects the annual
percentage change in general government consumption (not expenditure which includes
transfers) from 1980 to 1995 for a broader range of low and lower-middle income
highly indebted countries. Government spending on health, education, but also the
military, fall into government consumption. Expenditure on debt servicing, does not
however, fall into this category. There is a marked volatility in government
consumption after 1985 to the early 1990s. This also reflects trends in GDP growth, as
well as the need to divert expenditures towards debt servicing, which will lower
government consumption on services such as health and education.
Chart 2 examines three broad headings of average (median) tax revenues for the
countries included in Chart 1. What is clear is that the share of trade taxes as a
proportion of total revenue shows a marked tendency to decline between 1980 and
1990. This is a consequence of trade liberalization, part and parcel of the structural
adjustment policies of the 1980s and beyond. There is a much greater reliance on
indirect taxes on goods and services, whose share in total revenue is rising. Income,
9 The data in this section are drawn from the IMF (2000) and the World Bank (1999).10
profit and corporate tax rate shares are steadier although they decline after the mid
1980s reflecting the difficulties of taxing potentially mobile factors of production.10
Chart 3 reflects the growth in aid dependency. The share of aid in central government
expenditure shows a tendency to climb steeply. The indebtedness position of central
government as a proportion of GDP also shows a remarkable upward tendency. All of
these are not surprising given that the countries in question are severe growth failures,
starting from a low-income base. In contrast the overall budget deficit does not show an
upward trend, staying steady. One would have expected the deficit to rise, given the
difficulties in the economy, but it displays resilience, reflecting cuts in categories of
expenditure, other than debt servicing whose GNP share is also fairly constant. This
implies some cuts in social-sector spending, or at least no increase, at a time when it is
most needed.
In Chart 4 we have three broad headings of government expenditure. Spending on
education declines during the 1980s. Military expenditure is lower than on public sector
education, but greater than on public health spending for the years we have data.
Combined health and education spending is in excess of official military expenditure,
but this in the context of very low-income countries who do not face any major external
military threat. Furthermore, military expenditure does show an upward trend. It also
has to be borne in mind that given growth failure and the rise in poverty, the need for
social spending, including health and education will also have been rising considerably
during this period.
5 Conclusions
(i) The decline, or stagnation, in broad-based social expenditure, so crucial to the well
being of mother and child, occurs because of the confluence of three factors. First,
the government may derive less utility from this category of expenditure, compared
to the necessity of spending on its political support group, the military or other
prestige projects. Second, the authorities may find that they have less revenue in the
present era of globalization because of international tax competition, falling
domestic tax bases and capital flight. Third, in the interests of macroeconomic
stability, the government may have to balance its books. This usually means
expenditure reduction rather than revenue expansion. In a setting of overall
spending cuts, the burden borne by the social sector is often greater than in areas
such as defence.
(ii) Tax competition on internationally mobile capital can lead to a race to the bottom in
tax rates for small vulnerable economies. The stylized facts on FDI to developing
countries suggest that size does matter. By contrast larger developing countries and
OECD nations may be able to tax multinationals substantially, and still attract FDI.
Tax competition to attract FDI inflows is more applicable in the North-South arena,
resulting in the South as a whole having below OECD average corporation tax
rates. Intra-Northern FDI accounts for most of the world’s FDI stock as well as
10 For most countries data on revenues from taxes on profits is not separated by source, domestic or
foreign.11
flows. Most developing countries are marginalized when it comes to FDI inflows
from the North. China, Brazil and Mexico receive about 50 percent of all
developing country FDI inflows originating in the OECD. Other low-income
countries do not receive much FDI, except in the mining and energy sectors, despite
having a panoply of incentives for attracting FDI. In some instances, even a zero
tax regime would not attract any FDI because of negative perceptions regarding the
potential host nation. But the very existence of mobile capital, and the danger of its
exit, may induce developing countries in general to lower corporate tax rates below
the OECD average.
(iii) OXFAM (2000) has calculated that with a tax rate on multinationals equal to the
OECD average, and a moderate tax on the savings of individuals which have leaked
abroad would yield revenues of about US$50 billion to developing countries. They
assume that this could automatically be directed to social expenditure and poverty
alleviation. The implication is that sovereign states will spend it in the social sector
rather than on other wasteful forms of expenditure. Also, the benefits from the
‘release’ of these revenues may not accrue to the countries with the greatest need.
(iv) Then there is the question of the offshore financial centres (OFCs) that have
mushroomed in recent years. They often thrive on the proceeds of the nexus
between corruption, crime and conflict (see Addison et al. 2001). Globalization
raises OFC numbers, and the total amount of finance channelled through them.
Even G-7 countries are not immune from offshore activities. OECD led initiatives
are picking on small tax havens outside the OECD, but doing little to halt their own
domestic offshore and illegal activities. Flight capital is arguably a more important
source of lost revenue for low-income developing countries than tax competition
(Abacha in Nigeria and Mobutu in the DRC).
(v) For some (middle-income) developing countries there could be a loss of revenues
due to the volatility of short-tem speculative capital inflows, and financial
contagion spilling over from afflicted neighbours. Although a very limited number
of developing countries receive this form of financial flows, many more risk
contagion effects from neighbours. Exchange rate volatility, banking crises and
balance of payments problems arise from these types of speculative financial flows
that are themselves subject to herding behaviour. Banking crises, in particular,
mean huge taxpayer financed rescue packages, and these do cut deeply into the
social sector budget.
On the policy recommendation side, three points spring to mind:
(i) Governments and donors still need more convincing about the efficiency arguments
in favour of social expenditure. Not only does it promote sustainable human
development, but also high quality human capital is a necessary pre-condition for a
growth take-off. Furthermore, the absence of broad-based spending in the social
sector can lead to tensions and conflict, particularly when public expenditure is
discriminatory along ethno-linguistic lines, see Stewart (2000).
(ii) There is a greater need for policy coherence amongst donors interested in pro-poor
growth. This need emerges from the tricky business of designing aid conditionality
(see Murshed 2001, Murshed and Sen 1995). Policy coherence amongst bilateral12
and multilateral donors is all the more crucial in the context of the HIPC initiative,
which aims to divert debt-servicing to social sector expenditure.
(iii) There have been calls for a world tax authority (WTA) by OXFAM (2000) and
others such as Tanzi (1999). Such an organization could be a useful instrument for
information sharing, both in regard to criminal-fraudulent dealings, as well as
helping to ascertain the global income or profits of multinationals.13
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Health expenditure, public (% of GDP) 
Public spending on education, total (% of GNP) 
Military expenditure (% of GNP) TABLE 1
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION FOR SELECTED HIGHLY INDEBTED COUNTRIES
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Bolivia .. 8 -3 -12 4 -7.4 -14.1 -3.8 3.8 0.9 -0.1 3.3 3.7 2.5 3.1 6.6
Burkina Faso -11 10 53 -4 3 2.7 15.0 5.8 -3.9 -7.8 6.2 2.3 1.6 4.3 4.3 -2.6
Burundi -31 -8 16 -20 -3 13.3 21.7 -7.1 16.2 -0.9 5.3 -1.3 -0.4 21.5 -6.6 -13.4
Cameroon 6 7 8 13 8 7.3 27.7 -3.4 -18.3 -2.9 13.0 9.5 -16.6 -10.6 4.3 0.9
Central African Republic -6 -3 -11 -15 5 4.4 1.0 0.8 -1.1 -0.2 -0.8 1.3 -3.3 -10.7 22.1 -47.1
Congo, Dem. Republic 9 9 -5 -10 -6 0.6 0.8 9.1 25.7 -16.7 -6.9 -34.1 135.5 -31.1 -68.2 10.0
Congo, Republic 13 5 25 16 12 6.8 -2.1 -13.7 -3.3 4.6 -0.9 9.4 3.7 -5.5 -26.9 -38.1
Côte d'Ivoire -24 7 -4 0 -8 0.0 6.9 1.4 4.2 5.6 -18.1 -12.9 8.0 -3.6 -7.3 16.0
Ecuador 9 2 0 -6 -4 -4.2 -0.8 1.6 1.5 -2.7 2.1 -2.2 -3.2 -1.2 0.0 1.9
Ethiopia .. .. 8 21 -13 -12.5 19.2 9.0 12.5 3.5 0.1 -23.5 -42.8 21.6 10.6 2.7
Gabon 32 19 5 21 9 -2.2 -5.4 -19.5 -1.3 -9.8 -2.9 3.1 5.7 -2.0 0.8 21.8
Ghana 28 16 -11 -2 -13 14.9 14.9 3.5 0.5 4.5 0.5 5.3 18.7 18.7 -1.1 3.7
Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.2 4.3 16.0 10.9 2.1 3.4 -0.9 -2.4 1.8
Guinea-Bissau 2 5 20 2 15 -5.6 -4.7 5.5 39.0 -4.0 16.9 -9.0 -21.8 16.8 -1.3 10.4
Honduras 12 1 -3 -2 4 5.3 9.3 6.0 9.0 2.8 -13.5 -10.2 12.9 1.7 -2.7 -10.8
Jamaica -4 2 4 -1 -7 32.1 -19.2 45.2 10.5 -3.5 6.9 -16.8 -16.4 -17.1 8.0 21.0
Madagascar 5 0 -3 0 -2 2.5 -0.6 7.1 -4.2 5.7 -2.7 -6.9 -1.6 -1.5 -5.0 2.7
M a l a w i 4 - 4208 1 1 . 8 2 4 . 4 3 . 7 - 1 . 5 3 . 6 1 . 3 1 . 9 0 . 7 - 3 . 4 1 9 . 4 - 3 0 . 1
Mali -3 -9 -4 5 0 27.2 19.3 8.6 -6.8 16.2 1.3 7.2 -0.3 -6.1 -4.0 -3.0
Mauritania -12 -11 -19 7 -10 -2.6 -23.1 -3.8 -0.2 -4.2 8.6 1.3 -2.8 80.2 -13.0 -0.1
Mozambique .. 11 3 -1 -13 -18.5 1.0 2.0 4.5 12.0 1.0 -10.2 40.3 -34.7 -2.1 -35.1
Nicaragua 14 13 111 -21 13 11.8 0.0 26.3 -50.0 -16.7 30.0 -30.8 -11.1 -12.5 0.0 0.0
Niger -24 -6 6 1 -22 8.6 9.8 8.3 39.0 4.6 -5.2 -3.9 12.7 -5.9 3.0 -14.3
Nigeria 11 10 13 -4 -12 -19.9 -1.5 -25.6 24.8 -9.5 70.0 -21.8 33.7 8.7 -22.6 -10.6
Rwanda 0 71 -10 -7 -8 18.5 4.0 10.5 3.6 7.8 7.2 18.2 17.3 -13.9 -70.4 62.8
Sierra Leone .. 0 23 0 -9 20.0 4.3 -20.8 -13.7 8.0 9.5 -3.4 -5.8 5.8 8.1 9.4
Syrian Arab Republic 15659 - 7 . 5 - 1 0 . 1 - 2 2 . 6 - 1 7 . 6 2 4 . 8 2 . 1 - 9 . 3 6 . 3 - 2 . 7 3 . 5 1 2 . 0
Uganda .. .. .. 5 5 -1.8 -4.0 17.6 -5.3 -7.7 17.8 2.2 6.3 7.1 8.3 9.2
Zambia 12 15 -11 -16 6 -4.9 0.9 -18.7 -12.3 25.5 18.4 35.2 -9.9 -61.2 -9.0 -2.1
Source: World Bank (1999).